

VZCZCXRO4790  
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR  
DE RUEHDO #0311/01 0841335  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 251335Z MAR 07  
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6392  
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEAHLK/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DS/T/ATA (RSOLER), DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC (MHACKMAN),  
DS/IP/NEA (TLAAS & MZUPAN), DOE (PWILLGING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017

TAGS: [EPET](#) [ASEC](#) [ECON](#) [PREL](#) [QA](#)

SUBJECT: POST ACTION PLAN FOR ENGAGING QATAR ON ENERGY  
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

REF: A. DOHA163

[B](#). DOHA201

[C](#). DOHA285

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D.

[1](#). (C) Qatar's intention to become the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) and gas-to-liquids (GTL) leader by 2012 necessitates a robust energy infrastructure security program that it currently lacks. While the Qataris have adequately prepared a production and shipping infrastructure for the booming business, it appears that they are just beginning to determine how to protect it.

[2](#). (C) The U.S. interest is strong: By 2012 Qatar plans to produce 77 million tons of LNG annually, a third of which will be exported to the U.S. market. QatarGas production trains three and four will produce 2.8 billion cubic feet per day of LNG and RasGas is currently building two trains with 7.8 million tons per annum capacity. All four of these trains are allocated for U.S. markets and will be among the largest in the world. In addition, major U.S. energy companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are partners with Qatar and currently have USD 13 billion invested in Qatar's natural gas industry.

[3](#). (C) The huge U.S. investments in Qatar's energy industry coupled with the onset of gas exports in 2008/2009 to the U.S. presents an opportunity for Washington to collaborate with the Qatari government and Qatar Petroleum (QP) on the security of Qatar's critical energy sites. Working together on improving security is in our mutual economic and national security interest.

-----  
EMBASSY WORKING GROUP  
-----

[4](#). (C) Post has formed a DCM-led internal working group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO, SIMO, FCS, and RSO to lay the ground work for engagement with the GOQ on critical infrastructure protection. The group will have three principal roles:

-- Coordinate Mission reporting on the current and future security operations of international energy and joint venture companies. Post has already heard a range of comments (Refs A and B) from industry contacts at various stages of implementing their own security plans but are all looking to QP to provide an overarching structure within which to operate. The Mission will fill information gaps by maintaining our dialogue with QP on their security plans (ref

C), with international energy companies in Qatar, and with Qatari security services and the Qatari Armed Forces.

-- Coordinate engagement with the GOQ and lay the groundwork for an eventual bilateral working group on energy infrastructure protection.

-- Identify opportunities for U.S. exporters, including U.S. defense companies, that could contribute to Qatar's infrastructure protection efforts.

¶5. (C) The group will also communicate with the Department of Energy and other agencies to further Qatar's progress on critical energy infrastructure protection.

-----  
UPCOMING ACTIVITIES  
-----

¶6. (C) The March U.S. Coast Guard International Port Security Program inspection will further the Embassy working group's efforts to analyze Qatar's energy security infrastructure. In April, NAVCENT's Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) will visit Qatar to bring together Qatari government officials joint venture companies, and international energy partners to identify all the parties involved with energy infrastructure protection.

¶7. (C) In the medium term, we anticipate forming a joint working group to continue our dialogue on energy infrastructure security. The late April visit of Deputy Secretary of Energy would provide an appropriate opportunity

SIPDIS  
to present this idea to the GOQ. Post plans to investigate the possibility of bringing an extended TDYer from the

DOHA 00000311 002 OF 002

Department of Energy shortly thereafter to work with Post on continuing discussions with the Qatari government on this topic. Post also will work with DS/T/ATA to start the formal Critical Energy Infrastructure program in June to survey Qatar's infrastructure, recommend improvements, and assist with implementation.

¶8. (C) The Qatari government's appreciation for U.S. training and technology presents numerous prospects for U.S. commercial activity as the bilateral working group moves towards implementation. Qatar will need trainers, hard barriers, weapons, and technological equipment. Offshore protection is an area with the greatest opportunity as Qatar will need better and more vessels, plus surveillance equipment and weapons aboard them. Currently there are no standardized security practices, leaving a wide range of necessary preparation from each company and industrial city. We plan to work with FCS to promote U.S. economic opportunities in the development Qatar's burgeoning security infrastructure.

UNTERMEYER